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THE NATURAL LAW AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
EDWARD T. FAGAN, JR.*
T IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE that the classical definition of Marxist Com-

munism is best expressed in the socialist maxim: "The state shall take
from each according to his ability and give to each according to his
need." It is equally true yet not as commonly known that this, same
maxim is also a fair definition of what scholastics call that species of
justice applicable to state activity-distributive justice. ' Confusion is
created in the minds of many so-called intellectuals by this apparent
similarity of approach in respect to so fundamental a concept as state
activity. This confusion is frequently evidenced by assertions, such as
that of Rockwell Kent in his recently published autobiography, that
2
Christian philosophy and Communism are actually identical.
Such a deduction is patently absurd in view of the irreconcilable conflict between natural law and basic radical ideology. Proof of its absurdity lies in an explanation of the two basic differences which exist in
the application of the maxim by these opposing philosophies. These
differences can best be illustrated by an analysis of the scope of the
distributive operations of a totalitarian state as compared with the scope
of distributive justice within the framework of the natural law. Once
the proper application of the maxim is established and several other
current misconceptions of distributive justice have been corrected, we
will be in a position to evaluate its functions in our modern society.
-

Totalitarianism teaches that man is made for the state and that the
state is the source of all rights and property titles. It affords no recognition of any rights of the individual in his relations to the collectivity; it
accords no natural right to the human personality. In man's relations with
other individuals it teaches only the principle of absolute equality, re-
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jecting all hierachy and divinely constituted
authority including the authority of parents.
Whatever authority exists is that which is
derived solely from the community. In
the application of the maxim the totalitarian
state demands the ultimate of productivity
from each and in return allocates to each
an identical share of the product. Since such
a society is based solely on materialistic tenets, it becomes a collectivity with no other
hierachy than that of the economic system.
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It has only one goal: the production of material things by collective labor. The participatory share or allocation which it distributes to the individual is therefore
confined to a portion of material economic
goods, identical in quantity and quality
with that received by the other participants.
In contradistinction to this dialectical
materialism, natural law holds that man is
created by God to His Image and Likeness
and is endowed with an immortal sQul.
This soul, being spiritual, is itself a whole,
total and integral. By virture of this spiritual aspect of his nature, man is further

endowed by his Creator with a natural
right to all those things necessary to fulfill
his destiny. Private ownership is normally
necessary in order to live as a human being
and hence is included in the natural rights.
Natural law teaches further however that
man is essentially dual in nature. As a finite
being with a material body he is dependent to a great extent upon the activity and
association of other men for the full development of his physical, intellectual and
moral potentialities. These social benefits
are obtainable by him only through participation in joint endeavor with other
men, all of whom are motivated by the
same common desire-the attainment of
earthly happiness. A group of individuals
participating in such joint endeavor is
called a natural society, by virtue of the
fact that it has its origin in a dictate of
human nature. Natural societies are either
domestic, as exemplified by the family, or
civil, which assumes its highest form in the
complex organization of the sovereign
state.
As Americans we recognize that the
actual existence of the civil society which
we call the State is dependent upon the
free consent and mutual agreement of those
individuals desiring its formation. However, it is important for us to realize that
since the State is a dictate of human nature
it is a moral necessity based upon the natural aptitude, propensity and need of
man's rational being. The State therefore,
in its essence, is independent of the human
will and exists as a moral entity directed
by God to achieve an end, with God-given
natural rights and obligations predicated
upon such end.
While the State consists of and in the
individuals and families and exists for their
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benefit, the good or end sought by the
State differs from the individual or private
good of its members. The proper end of
the State is the public welfare or common
good of the society as such. According to
Josef Pieper it represents
[T]he very essence of those good things for
the sake of which a community exists and
which it must attain and make a reality if
it is to be said that all its potentialities have
been brought to fruition. 3
Although this social whole or State exists apart from the individuals, it is nevertheless composed of them and as such it is
obligated to give them their just due. As
component parts of a whole, the individual
citizens are entitled to a share of the whole
insofar as what belongs to the whole is
due to the part. This whole which the
citizens are entitled to share in by virtue
of membership is not a physical, tangible
substance which can be manufactured and
a portion of which handed over to a person. It is not the obligation of the State to
furnish temporal happiness ready-made to
its citizens. Rather, the purpose of the
State under natural law is to furnish to all
its members the opportunity and the
means, so far as is possible with the
material at its disposal, for them to attain
temporal happiness through self-activity.
This is the true meaning of public welfare
or the common good which is the whole
in which the citizens are entitled to share.
As so stated, the common good differs
vastly from the material economic goods
or social product which forms the whole
to be distributed by the totalitarian state.
The nature of the citizen's participatory
share is therefore the first basic difference

in the application of the maxim by the two
philosophies. Communism applies it to the
allocation among the citizens of the production and distribution of material goods.
The natural law applies it to an allocation
among the citizens of the participation in
the attainment of the common good.
The second basic difference in the
maxim's application lies in the size of this
participatory share as determined by the
distributing state.
St. Thomas states that justice is a habit
whereby a man renders to each one his
due by a constant and perpetual will. 4 He
says also that if the act of justice is, to give
to each man his due, then the act of justice
is preceded by the act whereby something
becomes his due.' It is clear therefore that
no obligation to do justice exists unless it
has as its presupposition this idea of the
due or right. However, in the individual's
relationship with the State, St. Thomas
observes that nothing belongs to him as
exclusively his; all that belongs to him is a
6
share in something common to everyone.
This due therefore, or claim of the citizen against the State, is not based upon an
exclusive personal right as in the case of
commutative justice. It is determined, St.
Thomas believed, only by relating the
thing's proportion to the person. 7 By this is
meant that the claim of one to a participation in the common good can only be properly ascertained by an evaluation of the
claimant.
The object and scope of distributive justice is now subject to concise statement.
4 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 11-l1, q. 58, art. 1, ad 6.
5 SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, Bk. I, c. 28.
6 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I1, q. 61, art. 1, ad 5.

3 PIEPER, JUSTICE 87 (1955).

7 Id., 1l-l1, q. 61, art. 2, ad 3.
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The ruler or authority in any natural society, must permit the individual member
to participate in the realization of the end
of that society (in the case of the State,
the common good) but only in accordance
with the measure of dignity, capacity and
ability that is distinctively his. This is the
size of the share which is due to the individual in distributive justice. This is what
scholastics mean when they say, "From
each according to his ability, to each according to his need."
Such application is far removed from
the Communist principle of absolute equality which requires a distribution among the
citizens of arithmetically equal amounts of
external goods. It may still be argued however that the equality achieved by the
Bolshevik application has a sounder basis
in justice.
Support for this argument can even bt
found in the words of St. Thomas, who said
that justice "denotes a kind of equality, as
its very name implies; indeed we are wont
to say that things are adjusted when they
are made equal...,,s
This very real difficulty is resolved when
we realize that although all men are equal
as moral entities, as human persons they are
unequal in desires, capacities and powers.
To allot them identical participatory shares
in the realization of the common good would
be to treat them unequally with regard to
the requisites of life and self-development.
It is obvious that the equal moral claims
of men, which admittedly arise out of their
moral equality, must be construed in relation to public welfare as claims to participate in that degree of welfare necessary
for the attainment of each claimant's
8 Id., 11-1l, q. 57, art. 1,ad 3.

private good. In the words of Pope Leo
XIII, speaking in his Encyclical Rerum
Novarum:
There are truly very great and very many
natural differences among men. Neither the
talents, nor the skill, nor the health, nor the
capacities of all are the same, and unequal
fortune follows of itself upon necessary inequality in respect to these endowments.
In view of the tremendously broad scope
of distributive justice, it is regrettable that
within the sphere of particular justice the
emphasis of the theology and philosophy
manuals is altogether on commutative justice while distributive justice is usually dismissed in a few lines. In many cases there
is a brief and inaccurate definition and no
more. It is most commonly defined as:
[Tihat species of justice which orders the
dealings of society toward its members and
inclines those in government to distribute
equitably the common goods and burdens
among the members of the commonwealth .. .9
As so stated, it conveys the erroneous
impression that distributive justice is realized by the State through the equitable
apportionment of community-owned tangible goods among its constituents, payment for which is collected in proportion
to that which is received. Such a definition
overlooks the basic feature of justice which
requires that a due or a right exist as a
prerequisite for obligation. Not even'the
Communists proclaim that the citizen has
the right to demand external goods from
the state purely by virtue of his citizenship.
This erroneous impression is corrected
by properly defining distributive justice as:
9 BITTLE, MAN AND MORALS 258 (1950).
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that species of justice which obliges the
authority to secure for each citizen his due
and proportionate share of both the advantages and the burdens which are involved in the conduct of civil society. This
definition expresses the true nature of the
share to which the individual is entitled in
distributive justice-a participatory share
in the common good.
While criticism can justifiably be directed
against the general lack of interest and unscholarly treatment which has allowed the
virtue of distributive justice to almost disappear from the field of morals, equal
criticism must be directed against those who
seek to extend the virtue beyond its proper
scope. Recently, the idea of distributive
justice has been applied to create distributive obligations in other than those who
are primarily intrusted with the custody of
the common good. The argument has been
made that its canons should apply to all
distributions of a common fund and that
the basis of all distributive right is the fact
that a group of persons have a right to a
divisible good. The work of distributive
justice would therefore be to determine the
share of each. 10
The late Monsignor John Ryan was one
,of the proponents of this approach. His
authoritative treatise, Distributive Justice,
was based upon the assumption that profits
per se represent a common fund and that
the employer has the obligation in distributive justice to equitably apportion the fund
to the various factors involved in production, including labor.
Monsignor Ryan was undoubtedly cor.
rect in his conclusion that distributive jus10 O'DoNOGHUE, The Scope of Distributive Justice, 21 IR. THEOL. Q. 291, 300 (1954).

tice can be applied to other than the
perfect society which is the State. Although
in its traditional usage the term is applied
to rulers of states, it is equally applicable
to the head or ruler of all natural societies.
It requires them, in respect to their authorized activity, to permit individual participation in the attainment of the social
end. He was incorrect however when he
applied it to those intrusted with property
other than that which is commonly owned
by all members of a natural society. By so
doing, he sought to establish that all profits
are immediately a part of the common
good. This overlooks the qualifications
which arise out of the nitural right of
private ownership.
It is therefore fallacious to say that a
worker has a right to an equitable share of
profits, arising out of distributive justice.
It might however be held that in social
justice, such a distribution would, under
certain conditions, promote the common
good. This would not give the worker any
general and unqualified right to participate
in profits. It would apply only in such
cases where an institution of this nature
would promote the general welfare.
Proof of the inaccuracy of Monsignor
Ryan's position may be found in the words
of Pope Pius XII in his 1949 address to
Catholic employers. He stated:
It would be just as untrue to assert that
every particular business is of its nature a
society, with its personal relationships determined by the norms of distributive
justice to the point where all without distinction-owners or not of the means of
production-would be entitled to their
share in the property, or at the very least
in the profits, of the enterprise. Such a conception stems from the assumption that
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every business belongs naturally within the
sphere of public law. The assumption is
inexact.
The most important single conclusion
which has been established at this point is
the fact that the citizen's capacities and
abilities are a part of the "good" of society.
Distributive justice therefore entails the
obligation of granting such abilities the
protection, support and fostering they need
for their full development. Such a conclusion, if stated thirty or forty years ago, in
the climate of rugged individualism, would
have been branded as almost subversive.
In that era, the vast majority of Americans,
both rich and poor, shared the belief that
the state had no real role to play as
guarantor of the citizen's good.
Today however, we have passed from
this climate into the new climate of welfare. There has been an evolution of a new
kind of American conservative and a new
philosophy for the American business community. It is one which fosters a viewpoint
that now takes pension and welfare plans for
granted as common industrial practice and
can even contemplate such ventures as
guaranteed annual wages without danger
of apoplexy. Politically, the classical tenets
of pure free enterprise have given way to
a new state doctrine which has its foundations in the tenets of welfare and
finds expression in social legislation which
tends to encourage rather than stifle free
enterprise.
This whole new approach is predicated
upon the assumption that the State has a
duty in distributive justice to intervene
when social conditions threaten serious
harm to the welfare of its citizens or any
substantial group within the community.

Because of the centuries of individualism,
the State is currently forced to act in countless situations where adverse social condi-.
tions have been established. Until organic
reform is achieved, such social legislation
is not only legitimate but necessary. Admittedly however, emphasis should be upon
a fundamental change in our social structure in favor of smaller, self-governing
societies. This is particularly true in connection with economic society since the
state is not the agency to promote ideal
economic conditions. In can coerce an
economic community on civil terms but it
cannot stimulate from within by supplying
the motives for efficient personal effort.
In making the determination as to the
government's role in specific cases, where
the question arises as to whether obligations in distributive justice exist, a sympathetic understanding of the principle of
subsidiarity is imperative if rational decisions are to be made. However, with
society becoming more complex and interdependent, many functions once performed
by private initiative can today be accomplished adequately and efficiently only with
the resources and under the direction of
the organized state. As the present Pontiff
declared:
[N]o one of good-will and vision will think
of refusing the State, in the exceptional conditions of the world today, correspondingly
wider and exceptional rights to meet popular needs. 11
Specific cases and concrete problems are
what we face however and our main interest lies in solutions in the practical order
of administration. With this in mind, let us
11 ENCYCLICAL LETrER ON THE FUNCTION OF THE

STATE IN THE MODERN WORLD (SUMMI PONTIFI-

CATuS) [1939].
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attempt to evaluate some of the current
activities of our own government and its
officials in light of the principles of distributive justice already established.
Taxation is the primary method employed by our government for distributing
the burdens involved in maintaining the
common good. So far as the common good
allows, distributive justice requires that
taxes should not be directly proportionate
to incomes, nor levied on a scale increasing
at a constant rate, but on a scale whose
rate of increase gradually diminishes until
at the upper limit it approximates to a
proportional tax. Such a tax may be called
"progressive." In theory, the ideal would
.be a single progressive tax on income but
in' practice a part of the public revenue
must be obtained through hidden taxes
which are more willingly accepted and do
not so easily become oppressive.
The canons of equality of sacrifice and
payment according to ability require progressive income taxes which concentrate
upoh the wealthier classes. On the other
hand, a dynamic system of expanding
economy requires retention of the profit
incentive and a stimulation of investment.
Both these factors must therefore be balanced in working out a just system which
will achieve a true proportional due in
respect to the individual tax burden.
Tax experts are in disagreement as to
the degree of progression in the existing
American system of taxation. All are in
agreement however that the principle of
progression is currently employed.1 2 The
most important consideration in the tax
area in regard to distributive justice there12 PAUL, TAXATION

(1954).

IN

THE UNITED STATES

762

fore is the proposed 23rd amendment to
the Constitution which is currently undergoing consideration by various state legislatures. The proposal seeks to repeal the
16th Amendment and reinstate that
Amendment with the limitation that "in no
case shall the maximum aggregate rate of
tax exceed 25% on incomes, estates, and
gifts." The taxes directly affected are the
most progressive elements in the federal
tax structure. A limitation on the rates of
these taxes would reduce the extent to
which federal taxes could be distributed in
accordance with taxpaying ability. Such a
proposal is therefore offensive to the principles of distributive justice, and unless it
is established that the measure is absolutely
necessary for the common good, the American people should reject it in its entirety.
Switching now from burdens to benefits,
we find it firmly established in American
tradition that the good of the community
lies, in part, in economic freedom. Under
a system of economic freedom however, if
there are no safeguards for the individual,
the costs are largely in terms of insecurity
growing out of the dynamic nature of a
free system.
Distributive justice therefore demands
that in this free system there exist such
government programs as unemployment insurance. social security, housing, collective
bargaining, bank deposit insurance, securities regulation and agricultural price supports. Our government is presently complying with all these demands,-the extent of
the compliance depending upon the development stage of the particular program.
Motivated by the same obligation, the
role which the government has taken in
resource development has opened the way
to further private economic activity. The
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peaceful development of atomic energy
has been made available to private initiative. A vigorous anti-trust law enforcement
has prevented monopoly power from exerting its corrosive influence. The dignity
of labor and its contribution to the common good has been recognized in "Right
to Work" legislation.
The common good however extends far
beyond the existence of opportunities for
the attainment of material goods. The
government has the responsibility for insuring adequate care and treatment for the
sick, disabled and mentally retarded. Various proposals for government sponsored
medical and hospitalization insurance are
presently under consideration as supplements to our already gigantic public health
program.
The area of education is also properly a
part of the common good. Although the
State must respect the reasonable wishes
of the parents who have the fundamental
right to educate their children, it must insure the educational rights of the family and
of those groups which are the agents of the
family in education. Employing the principle of subsidiarity, the state has the duty
to do in education whatever the family
and its agents cannot do. It is part of the
common good that citizens achieve at least
a certain minimum cultural level. Our
gover..ment has provided a religiously neutral public school system in compliance
with this obligation.
Unfortunately, the financing aspect of
this public school system is violative of
principles of distributive justice in that it
requires Catholic parents to support Catholic parochial schools entirely at their own
expense. As Pope Pius XI said of the
American parochial school system in his

Encyclical on Christian Education:
Such education is not aided by public
funds, as distributive justice requires.
It has been suggested that this objection
can be overcome by government subsidies
to children whose parents cannot conscien3
tiously enroll them in the public schools.'
It was in this way that the Veterans Administration subsidized the education of
veterans after World War II.
It is important to note that justification
for all this government activity has been
based solely upon obligations arising in distributive justice. Since distributive justice
seeks, not directly the common good of
society, but rather the proportionate share
ing among its members of the benefits and
burdens included in the common good, it
is equally important to realize that this
species of justice has only individual rights
as its object.
St. Thomas writes: "The common good
takes precedence over the private good, if
it be of the same genus." 14 Accordingly, it is
conceivable that a practice favored by distributive justice might not be prudent in
the light of the common good. Thus, as
previously mentioned, if it is absolutely
necessary that a large sum of money be
immediately raised for government expenditures, the common good might demand
a tax policy with a broad base, rather than
one concentrated on those most able to pay.
So also, "Right to Work" legislation might
conceivably be detrimental to the common
good as creating obstacles to effective labor

13 MULLANEY, The Natural Law, The Family, and
Education, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 102, 115 (1915).
14 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 152, art. 4, ad 3;
see also 1-1I, q. 113, art. 9, ad 2.

JANUARY, 1956

organization. In such cases, social justice,
which seeks the common good, would take
precedence.
In conclusion, I should like to discuss
for a moment the vice which is contrary
to distributive justice-namely, the respect
of persons. By respect of persons I mean
allotting to a person more than that proportion of the common good which in justice is his due. This is the vice which is
most commonly found in our government
officials.
It is particularly in the appointment of
applicants to government positions that the
virtue of distributive justice must be practiced. It is the duty of the official authorized
to make these appointments, to choose
those individuals whom he honestly considers most worthy and most capable from
among those available. Although in making
some appointments the one in charge may
take into consideration the political creed
of the persons selected, such as Cabinet
appointments, .the vast majority of appointive positions require the one most likely to
give the most effective service toward the
common good.

... [O]ne who makes such appointments
would fail against distributive justice if he
based his choice, not on worth or ability,
but on personal friendship or the advantages he can gain for himself or the party
15
by the selection of certain persons.

It may well be that the remedy for this
evil lies not only in teaching some politicians their moral responsibilities but also
in educating the general public to a greater
moral awareness. If public opinion upon
corruption is so clear that the politician
proven corrupt vanishes from public life,
then corruption will become exceptional.
Having opened this paper by posing and
answering the question raised by the ostensible similarity of Communist principles
with those of distributive justice, I think it
fitting and appropriate to close with an
equally provocative question: Is man, by
the operation of a particular State, more
of a man or less of a man?-If the answer
is that man is perfected in his social nature,
then it is safe to assume that distributive
justice has been achieved by that State.
15 CONNEL-L,

Morality and Modern Politics, 4

THOUGHT PATTERNS 77 (1953).

